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ARGUMENT 
A p p e l l a n t r e p l i e s t o R e s p o n d e n t 1 ^ P o i n t s I and I I a s 
f o l l o w s : 
Inasmuch as P i n t s I and I I in R e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f d e a l wi th 
due p r o c e s s and p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , we w i l l t r e a t t hem 
t o g e t h e r h e r e i n . 
Respondent spends much t ime t a l k i n g about C a r l s o n v s . Bos, 
59 Utah Advance R e p o r t s 12 (June 9 , 1987) jin an e f f o r t to d e f i n e 
due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s . F i r s t of a l l | , A p p e l l a n t does not 
c o n t e n d t h a t d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a c l t u a l n o t i c e i n a l l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . No d o u b t s u b s t i t u t e d s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s i s 
a p p r o p r i a t e in c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The m a i n s t a y of our due 
p r o c e s s a rgumen t i s t h a t t h e r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e s t a n d a r d s e t 
f o r t h in 16-10-13(2) UCA was not me t . 
R e s p o n d e n t makes s e v e r a l r e f e r e n c e s in some 15 pages of 
1 
text that Carlson overruled Graham v, Sawaya, 632 P2d 851 Utah 
(Utah 1981) and replaced its "reasonable assurance" standard with 
a balancing test that weighs the state!s interest against the 
individual's interest in an effort to determine what form of 
process satisfies due process. We do not read Carlson that way. 
Nowhere in Carlson is there language that expressly 
overrules Graham but rather some language suggesting a 
deportation from some of the rationale and conclusion of Graham. 
Certainly as stated by Justice Zimmermann in order to avoid 
Constitutional infirmity the requirements of Mullane vs. Hanover 
Bank & Trust; 339 US 306, (1950) can not be circumvented by 
Car Ison. We conclude that Carlson sets forth a standard of 
"diligent effort" not unlike that of reasonable diligence as 
outlined in 16-10-13(2) UCA. 
"For the foregoing reasons we conclude that a 
Plaintiff proceeding under Section 41-12-8 cannot 
satisfy federal due process requirements by using 
substitute service of process mailed to the last 
known address without having shown that diligent 
efforts have been made to locate the Defendant. 
Only by making a satisfactory showing of diligence 
can such a Plaintiff satisfy the requirements of 
the lien by demonstrating that the form of notice 
chosen is as reasonably calculated to reach the 
Defendant as any other practical alternative." 59 
Utah Advance Reports at 16 [Emphasis added] 
Again we concede substituted service of process is 
appropriate upon a showing of reasonable diligence, but only upon 
a showing of reasonable diligence. As in Carlson, the record 
herein does not reflect any testimony setting forth reasonable 
diligence except on affidavit of Respondent which was rebutted by 
Appellant's counter-affidavit. Appellant was not afforded any 
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o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y to overcome R e s p n d e n t ' 3 showing of r e a s o n a b l e 
d i l i g e n c e . 
R e s p o n d e n t a s s e r t s t h a t as per t h e c o u r t below t h a t i t 
e x e r c i s e d r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e and went to g r e a t l e n g t h s to t r y 
and e f f e c t p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e on D e f e n d a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t . 
However, t h e e v i d e n c e in t h e r e c o r d i s in t h e form of A f f i d a v i t s 
and C o u n t e r - A f f i d a v i t s , not d i r e c t t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e taken a t 
any e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , t r i a l or o t h e r forum wherein a p p e l l a n t 
had t h e r i g h t to c r o s s - e x a m i n e r e s p o n d e n t s w i t n e s s e s . Such an 
e f f o r t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e a s h o w i n g of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e 
c e r t a i n l y f l i e s in the face of r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s on t h e m e r i t s 
and t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s to c r o s s - e x a m i n e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t 
him. R e s p o n d e n t ' s amended a f f i d a v i t of n o n - s e r v i c e a l l e g i n g a t 
l e a s t twenty a t t e m p t s on Richard Smith and t w e n t y a t t e m p t s on 
Gary Smith w i t h o u t naming any d a t e s or t imes i s a t b e s t a shoddy 
shotgun approach to e s t a b l i s h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e and does not 
conform to t h e s t a n d a r d s of Ca r l son or Graham. 
In r e p l y to r e s p o n d e n t ' s P o i n t I I I , we o f f e r t h e f o l l o w i n g 
comments: 
P r i n c i p a l l y , r e s p o n d e n t r e l i e s on t h e h o l d i n g in Meyers 
v s . i n t e r w e s t C o r p . , 632 P 2d 881 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) . We d i s t i n g u i s h 
Meyer ' s f a c t s from t h e f a c t s of t he instant^ c a s e . In Meyer t h e 
d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l e d from t h e t r i a l c o u n t ' s o r d e r g r a n t i n g 
P l a i n t i f f ' s mot ion to amend the summons and denied d e f e n d a n t ' s 
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s fo r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . D e f e n d a n t , a 
C o l o r a d o e n t i t y was served p u r s u a n t to U t a h ' s longarm s t a t u t e 
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but did not file an answer. Approximately two years after 
service of process, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss stating 
that the summons had stated 20 days to answer the complaint as 
opposed to the statutory 30 days allowed an out-of-state 
defendant. Plaintiff amended its summons after the statute of 
limitations had run. The court held that this was not material 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party stating: 
"The defendant was clearly on notice by means of a summons 
and complaint which were filed prior to the running of the 
statute, that it was being sued and would have to marshall 
its witnesses and evidence. Although the summons may have 
been defective, the defect was unconsequential, and the 
passage of time did not deprive the trial court of the 
power to permit an amendment." Id at 8 81. 
The Meyers case was talking about a defect in the summons 
that if complied with would not have prejudiced defendant's 
rights. In the instant case we are concerned with whether 
reasonable diligence has been met and whether the court abused 
its discretion in allowing respondent to show reasonable 
diligence by such an amended affidavit of nonservice. 
On the facts, the defendant in the Meyers case had full 
knowledge of the pending action against it, but of its own 
volition chose not to answer the complaint, though it had 
approximately two years to do so. In the instant case, appellant 
never knew of the pending action nor was it ever afforded an 
opportunity to answer the complaint or in any way respond to the 
action that had been brought against it. 
Respondent cites Meyers for the principal that material 
prejudice will seldom result. If material prejudice results even 
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once, then it is an abuse of discretion. In the instant case, if 
respondent is allowed to perfect its service of process without a 
showing of reasonable diligence except for its amended affidavit 
of nonservice, then appellants only hope is to seek equity under 
the principals of Rules 60(b)l and 60(b)7. Clearly to allow such 
an amended affidavit of nonservice materially prejudices the 
substantial rights of appellant. In the alternative, if this 
court holds that it was an abuse of discretion to allow such a 
amended affidavit of nonservice, then at wprst, respondent is 
compelled to try its case on the merits. One way appellant 
loses; the other way appellant may lose, but only upon the merits 
of the case. 
In response to Point IV, appellant teplies as follows: 
In Point IV of its argument, respondent cites the case of 
Gardiner & Gardiner Builders vs. Swap, 656 P.2d, 429 (Utah 1982) 
in an effort to persuade this court thlat appellant is not 
entitled to relief under 60(b)l. We distinguish our facts from 
those of Gardiner: 
I n
 Gardiner, defendant Reed Swapp had failed to respond to 
discovery procedures full well knowing of the underlying cause of 
action. As a sanction, the court ordered pleadings of defendant 
to be stricken and enter default judgment ^gainst defendant Reed 
Swap. In the instant case, we had no knowledge of the underlying 
cause of action prior to default judgment b^ing entered. 
I n
 Gardiner
 f defendant Swapp failed to file his motion to 
set aside based on Rule 60(b)(1) URCP withiri the three month time 
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l i m i t of Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) URCP. In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a p p e l l a n t 
immedia te ly f i l e d motion to s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment (wel l 
w i t h i n the 3 month l i m i t ) p u r s u a n t among o t h e r t h i n g s , to Rule 
60(b) (1) and 60(b) (7), 
In addition, the Gard iner court found that the alleged 
negligence or abandonment by defendant's attorney was not 
supported by the record. 
lf[T]he records shows that the failure to communicate may 
have not been entirely the negligence of the attorney. . . 
[S]wapp failed to contact his attorney for one and a half 
years after he filed his answer and counterclaim." 
In the instant case, appellant upon learning of default 
judgment, which constituted the only notice of the action against 
him, caused its attorney to immediately file a motion to set 
aside default judgment. 
Respondent's use of the Gard iner holding adds little 
weight to the proposition that appellant ought to be denied his 
day in court because the trial judge was clearly within the scope 
of his discretion in Gard iner . We assert that the facts in 
Gard iner are substantially different than those of the instant 
case so as to deny that conclusion. 
Respondent cites the case of Stesu, Inc. v. Roger Toole 
Drywall, Inc., 234 S.E. 2nd 102 (GA 1977), as authority for the 
proposition that a defendant failing to claim certified mail is 
cited with having constructive notice of a pending action. 
The Georgia statutes have a statute similar to Utah's that 
allows for substituted service "whenever its registered agent 
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered 
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o f f i c e , 1 1 i d . a t 1 0 3 . In t he S tesu casej , t h e c o u r t den ied t h e 
mot ion to s e t a s i d e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e f a u l t judgment bu t s t a t e d : 
"Here t h e r e c o r d d o e s no t e s t a b l i s h t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t c o u l d no t be fjsund w i t h ( r e a s o n a b l e 
d i l i g e n c e ) a t t h e r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e 
o r d e r of December 29 , 1975, r e c i t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was 
r e g u l a r l y s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s and t h e r e was Nproof of 
s e r v i c e of summons.1 "Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a l t h o u g h 
t h e r eco rd does not a f f i r m a t i v e l y ' r e v e a l f u l l compl iance 
wi th t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s as tq> r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e , 
a b s e n t a c o n t r a r y showing by de f endan t (an none was made) , 
we w i l l presume the . r e g u l a r i t y of tihe p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w . " 
I d . a t 104 [emphasis added] 
In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e i s a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e on t h e 
r e c o r d , p r i m a r i l y t h e a f f i d a v i t of Barbara Smi th , to d i s p u t e and 
r e b u t any a l l e g a t i o n s of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e a s s e r t e d in 
r e s p o n d e n t ' s amended a f f i d a v i t of n o n s e i j v i c e . T h e r e f o r e , we 
d i s t i n g u i s h ou r c i r c u m s t a n c e s from thosie of Se t su in t h a t we 
o b j e c t to a showing of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e . 
R e s p o n d e n t n e x t r e l i e s on R i f e n b g r g v . L i f f i t o n Homes, 
I n c . , 107, A.D. 2d, 1015, 486 N.Y.S . 2d 529 (New York 1985) to 
s u p p o r t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s r e c e i p t of t h e n o t i c e of 
c e r t i f i e d l e t t e r in t h e i n s t a n t c a s e should have charged him wi th 
k n o w l e d g e of t h e l e t t e r ' s c o n t e n t s . We do not read Rifenburg 
t h a t way. Rifenburg had a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n where t h e de f endan t 
had been mai led s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s by c e r t i f i e d mai l and as in 
t h i s c a s e , t h e m a i l was r e t u r n e d u n c l a i m e d . H o w e v e r , t h e 
Ri fenburg c o u r t focused on a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t s e t of f a c t s than 
t h e i n s t a n t ca se s t a t i n g : 
" D e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to defend a s u i t when i t i s shown t h a t 
i t x d i d not p e r s o n a l l y r e c e i v e n o t i c e of t h e summons i n 
t i m e to d e f e n d 1 i s g i v e n s t r o n g p r o t e c t i o n . [Omit t ing 
c a s e s ] . . . The s t a t u t e was not i n t e n d e d , however, to 
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p e r m i t a c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t to i g n o r e n o t i c e of c e r t i f i e d 
m a i l and l e a v e such mail unclaimed a t t h e p o s t o f f i c e , " 
[Emphasis added] Id a t 5 3 1 . 
In t h e i n s t a n t case d e f e n d a n t d id not i g n o r e t h e n o t i c e of 
c e r t i f i e d ma i l and l e a v e i t u n c l a i m e d a t t h e p o s t o f f i c e b u t 
r a t h e r as soon as i t s agen t came home from t h e weeks c o n s t r u c t i o n 
a c t i v i t i e s immedia te ly made e f f o r t to go to t h e p o s t o f f i c e and 
c l a i m t h e l e t t e r . The f a c t s show t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t 
d id e v e r y t h i n g i t cou ld in t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n to c l a im t h e l e t t e r 
o n l y t o f i n d , a s s t a t e d , t h a t i t had been r e t u r n e d t o t h e 
S e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s o f f i c e . The b a s i s upon which a p p e l l a n t 
c l a i m s e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t i s in t h a t f a i l u r e to fo l low up wi th t h e 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s o f f i c e t o f i n d o u t wha t t h e l e t t e r 
c o n t a i n e d . But nowhere in the r eco rd i s t h e r e a showing t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t s imply ignored t h e n o t i c e of c e r t i f i e d m a i l . 
CONCLUSION 
Due process is a requirement for personal jurisdiction. 
Either you have it or your don't. In the instant case, 
Respondent had the duty to make a showing of reasonable diligence 
as outlined in 16-10-13(2) UCA before it relied on substituted 
service of process. Without a showing of reasonable diligence, 
Respondent has not met the due process requirements under 16-10-
13(2) UCA, Graham, Carlson, or Mullane. While we do not contest 
the constitutional firmity of substituted process if meets 
statutory requirements, we do contest any service of process 
which does not meet the statutory requirement of reasonable 
diligence to establish due process. 
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Tl ie un.l y way R e s p o n d e n t c a n m a k e a s h o w i n g o f r e a s o n a b l e 
d i l i g e n c e i s f o r * :n i s c o - i e t ; i i i . ^ J • t -•* 3mended a f f i d a v i t o f 
n o n s e r v i c e 11 ! ~-wev, *v .. r n 
I 111' 110 I . . *- i : eo ,
 A is o s po i i d r n 1 L n a t " ma t e r 1 a 1 o r e i u a i c e 
a l m o s t n e v e r o c c u r s , . - v e r y c l e a r t ha t - t h e r e s e l l u t i ^ r 
t h e i s s u e r e q a r c 1 i-J.-J ' h* ) ' *•,-.• 1 .it- . : ; ; . 
r i ; ! i b - j [ \ ' i , ' ' . ; .. .' >o s o m e t - x t e i i t , o u t c o m e d e t e r m i n a t i v e . 
T h a t i s , o y a l l o w i n g i «• , A p p e 1 i a n • m . i ^  r n -j • r ^ I ^ 
equitable powers cc "''•< . • , . • ) 
0 e r e d S : : o n 1 . u u r
 y \ p p e k I ant a n d 
R e s p o n d e n t b a c k in r : * * i ' r e s p e c t i v e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s when t h i s 
l a w s u i t w a s c o m m e r c e d . 
>jf ippL . :ai\ ji.-i n o t s e c r e t i t s e l f , a t t e m p t '~ , 3 V o i d 
s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s , o r m i e n t 1 o n a 1 1 / , q n o r e n c»r ,- e " *' a 
r e g i s t e r e d 1 ^ t t e r 1 e a v 1 n^ 1 ' 1 i »e< , s 
a 11 e q e o " : - e a r n 1 rig o t t h e uo( J> •- J : i < e r t i " ( ed Tin . , , 
A p p e l L a r i t " s a g e n t J I J I ^ K I ; r e s p o n d e d o n l v t o t\nd * he ma ' n d 
b e e n r e t u r n e d r * f - P S e c r e t a r . ** 3 
A p pe « , • n u t o t > ; r t i f i ed 
m a i l t :> f , u oi.t : t s ^ p a t e n t s T h o s e f a c t s a r e s i a n i f l n n ^ v 
d i f f e r e n t ^ hn n a n y t_,,-i-^ r e l i e d "\ - > i 1 
J i- i - - , p 1 , J fi; v. v.. .1 - L * , e s 
e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t w i t h i n t h e p r e v i e w of R u l e 60 ( n . ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , A p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i ^ ^ J - 1 
w i t h i n s t i . • -< is";-A- . le t 1 , < n . i a u i * juUgmenr isi,; 
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allow Appellant to proceed upon the merits and advance its 
defenses. 
DATED this j ^ day of September, 1987. 
BAIL£X—& JJELSON 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to John Knapp Baird, 215 South State Street, Suite 800, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this &\ day of September, 1987. 
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